We revisit the problem of general-purpose private function evaluation (PFE) wherein a single party P 1 holds a circuit C, while each P i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n holds a private input x i , and the goal is for a subset (or all) of the parties to learn C(x 1 , . . . , x n ) but nothing else. We put forth a general framework for designing PFE where the task of hiding the circuit and securely evaluating its gates are addressed independently: First, we reduce the task of hiding the circuit topology to oblivious evaluation of a mapping that encodes the topology of the circuit, which we refer to as oblivious extended permutation (OEP) since the mapping is a generalization of the permutation mapping. Second, we design a subprotocol for private evaluation of a single gate (PFE for one gate), which we refer to as private gate evaluation (PGE). Finally, we show how to naturally combine the two components to obtain efficient and secure PFE.
Introduction
In a private function evaluation (PFE) protocol, a party P 1 holds a function f , and its corresponding circuit C f , while every party P i holds a private input x i ; their goal is for a subset (or all) of the parties to learn f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) without learning any information beyond this. 1 In particular, besides the size of the circuit, and the length of P 1 's inputs and outputs, P i (i ≥ 2) should not learn anything else about the circuit. This is in contrast to the standard setting for secure multi-party computation where the function f and the corresponding circuit C f are publicly known to all the participants. PFE is particularly useful in scenarios where learning the function compromises privacy, reveals security vulnerabilities, or when service providers need to hide the function or a specific implementation of it to protect their Intellectual Property. A number of papers in the literature have considered the design of efficient special and general-purpose private function evaluation protocols [AF90, KM11, GHS10, SS09, PSS09, BFK + 09, KS08a, IP07, BPSW07] .
Solutions Based on Universal Circuits. Most general-purpose PFE solutions reduce the problem to secure computation of a universal circuit U g that takes as input the circuit C f (with at most g gates), and the parties' private inputs x 1 , . . . , x n , and outputs f (x 1 , . . . , x n ). The main objective of this line of work is to design smaller size universal circuits, and to optimize their implementation using existing MPC constructions such as Yao's garbled circuit protocol [KS08a, Sch08, SS09] .
The Universal circuit approach works with any secure MPC protocol for evaluating boolean circuits and is applicable to both the two-party and the multi-party settings. Its main disadvantage, and the main motivation for other alternatives is the additional overhead in efficiency due to the size of universal circuits and the complexity of designing and implementing such circuits. Valiant [Val76] showed a construction of a boolean universal circuit achieving an optimal circuit size of |U g | ≈ 19g log g. Kolesnikov and Schneider [KS08a] gave an alternative construction of universal circuits. They obtain a worse asymptotic bound of |U g | ≈ 1.5g log 2 g, but their techniques lead to smaller constant factors and seem to yield smaller universal circuits than Valiant's construction for circuit sizes less than 5000. Furthermore, the universal circuit approach does not provide a satisfactory solution in case of arithmetic circuits. While universal arithmetic circuits exist (e.g. see [SY10] and [Raz08]), their sizes are too large for any practical purpose (e.g. as high as O(g 5 )).
Solutions Based on Homomorphic Encryption. It is relatively easy to design a PFE based on a fully homomorphic encryption scheme [Gen09] . While asymptotically optimal, this solution is not practical due to its high computational cost. Recently, Katz and Malka [KM11] designed a novel two-party PFE protocol based on a singly homomorphic encryption. Complexity of the resulting protocol is linear in the size of the circuit but the number of public-key operations is also linear in the size of the circuit. Standard techniques for reducing public-key operations (e.g. OT extension) do not seem applicable either. Given the significant gap between the efficiency of public-vs. symmetric-key operations, this new approach improves over the universal circuit only when dealing with large circuits. Finally, this solution only works in the two-party setting.
Our Contribution
Practical design and implementation of MPC has been the subject of active research in the last few years. These efforts have, in part, lead to the introduction of several software implementations and MPC frameworks [MNPS04, PSSW09, HEKM11, KSS12]. As discussed above, however, when it comes to PFE the situations is not the same. The existing solutions are considerably less scalable and more expensive compared to their MPC counterparts, and no good solution exists for the multiparty case, or when considering arithmetic circuits.
We revisit private function evaluation with the intention of designing more practical two-party and multi-party constructions. In particular, we put forth a general framework for designing PFE and show how it enables us to construct more efficient PFE variants of the well-known MPC protocols.
Our Framework for Designing PFE. In order to fully hide a circuit C, one needs to hide two types of information about it: (i) the topology of the circuit, and (ii) the function of the gates in the circuit (AND, OR, XOR). Note that these are in addition to what is already hidden in a MPC setting. Following this observation we divide the task of private function evaluation into two different functionalities: (1) the Circuit Topology Hiding (CTH) functionality, and (2) the Private Gate Evaluation (PGE) functionality. Next, we describe these two functionalities in more detail:
• CTH Functionality. We observe that the topology of a circuit C can be fully described using a mapping π C : {1 . . . |OW|} → {1 . . . |IW|} where OW (outgoing wires) is the union of the set of input wires {ow 1 = x 1 , . . . , ow n = x n }, and the output wires for each non-output gate in the circuit {ow n+1 , . . . , ow n+g−o } (g is the circuit size and o is the number of output gates), and IW (incoming wires) is the set of input wires to all the gates in the circuit {iw 1 , . . . , iw 2g }. π C maps i to j (π C (i) = j) if and only if wire ow i ∈ OW is connected to iw j ∈ IW, in the circuit C. Note that since the fan-out for each gate can be more than one, π C is not always a function, but it is easy to check that its inverse π −1 C is. Note that the party who knows the function f and the corresponding circuit C can efficiently compute π C . Figure 1 (a) demonstrates an example circuit and its corresponding mapping. Intuitively the F CT H functionality provides a mechanism for obliviously applying the mapping π C to the n input values and the (g − o) values for intermediate outgoing wires (i.e. mapping them to incoming wires) in an on-demand fashion, and as the MPC protocol proceeds.
• PGE Functionality. The PGE functionality can be seen as a PFE protocol where the function is a single gate. P 1 provides the gate's functionality, while all parties including P 1 provide their shares of the two inputs to the gate. The functionality returns to each party, his share of the gate's output.
These two functionalities can be naturally composed to obtain a complete PFE protocol as described in Table 1 : Comparison of our OSN-based oblivious shuffling vs. HE-based and garbled circuit-based constructions. Let N denote the number of elements being permuted, be the length of each element and k is the security paremeter. The last column shows some concrete efficiency gain of our OSN construction over the corresponding construction for 128 ≤ N ≤ 8192, = 32. These numbers are based on experiments in [HEK12] . We expect similar gains for larger values of N too.
Efficient Realizations of F CT H . We refer to the mapping π C : {1 . . . |OW|} → {1 . . . |IW|} discussed above as an extended permutation (EP) since it not only permutes the elements in {1 . . . |OW|}, but also can replicate them as many times as needed. A main component of our F CT H realization is a protocol for oblivious evaluation of this extended permutation (OEP) on a vector of inputs: the first party holds π C and a blinding 2 vector t of size |IW|, while the second party holds an input vector x of size |OW|. Their goal is to let the second party learn the output of π C applied to x, blinded by t. Neither party should learn anything else. OEP can be instantiated using a singly homomorphic encryption, or any general-purpose 2PC. As discussed in Section 4, however, neither solution is efficient enough for use in practice. We introduce a new and efficient construction for OEP based on generalized switching networks and oblivious transfer. OEP via Generalized Switching Networks. First, we show how to efficiently implement an extended permutation using a generalized switching network SN. Such a network is a set of interconnected switches where each switch maps two inputs to two outputs, using at most two selection bits. This is a generalization of the well-known permutation networks since the network uses four different switch types (as opposed to two), as specified by its two selection bits. Once the EP is represented using a SN, we solve the OEP problem by designing a new OT-based protocol for Oblivious Switching Network evaluation (OSN) where one party P 1 holds the selection bits to SN, and a blinding vector t, while the other party P 2 holds the input vector x to the SN. The goal is for P 2 to learn the output of SN applied to the input vector x, blinded by t. Our OSN protocol runs in a constant number of rounds and requires O(g) oblivious transfers where g is the number of switches in the network. The resulting OEP is more efficient than the homomorphic-based solutions since the number of exponentiations can be made independent of the size of the network (using OT extension), and is more efficient than the Yao-based one since the complexity of our construction does not grow with the number of bits needed to represent each input element. We also need a multiparty variant of our OEP protocol where the mapping is known to a single party while the input vector x and the blinding vector t are shared among the players. We show how to construct such an m-party OEP protocol via m invocations of the two-party version. Improved Oblivious Shuffling. Digressing from the main topic of this paper, we note that OSN is a generalization of the previously studied problems such as oblivious shuffling [HEK12] (a subprotocol used for private set intersection), or secure two-party permutation [WLG + 10, Du01]. Our new construction yields more efficient solutions to these problems as well, improving on the previous proposals based on garbled circuit implementation of sorting networks, permutation networks, or randomize shell sort [HEK12, WLG + 10, Du01]. See Table 1 for concrete (a factor of 25 or more improvement over best previous solutions) and asymptotic efficiency comparisons with previous work.
Applying our Framework to Existing MPC. We apply the above framework to the GMW protocol [GMW87], Yao's garbled circuit protocol [Yao86] , and secure computation of arithmetic circuits via homomorphic encryption [CDN01] . In each case we obtain the most efficient PFE construction to date, for the considered setting. Linear Multi-party PFE. We apply our framework to the seminal GMW protocol [GMW87] to obtain a multiparty PFE against a dishonest majority. The CTH component can be instantiated using either the HE-based or the SN-based OEP discussed above. We also design a simple and efficient multiparty PGE functionality given a multiparty OT as in [FGM07] . To the best of our knowledge, this is the first multiparty PFE besides the generic solutions of applying MPC to universal circuits. When instantiated using a HE-based OEP, it yields the first multiparty PFE with linear complexity (in the circuit size) and when instantiated using our new SN-based OEP, it yields a black-box construction based solely on OT.
What makes the second instantiation desirable from a practical point of view, as demonstrated in some recent GMW implementations [CHK + 12, NNOB21], is that it only uses oblivious transfers. As a result, one can use OT extension [IKNP03] and pre-processing techniques [Bea95] to significantly reduce the number of public-key operations, and to shift the bulk of the computation to an offline phase. Table 2 compares the efficiency of these two constructions with the only other alternative, i.e. using GMW with universal circuits. More Efficient Two-party PFE. We also design a constant round two-party PFE based on Yao's garbled circuit protocol [Yao86] . Once again, the F CT H functionality is realized using our OEP constructions and for the F PGE functionality we use Yao's garbling/ungarbling algorithms. To ensure that functions of the gates are hidden, we build the circuit entirely out of NAND gates. As we will see in Section 5.3, multiple subtleties need to be addressed for this work and in particular to guarantee that the circuit evaluator can unblind garbled keys during the evaluation of the garbled circuit without learning the values for the intermediate wires.
We note that the construction of [KM11] also fits in the general framework described above (though not presented in this way). However, our new abstraction helps us gain more efficiency improvements. When using our HE-OEP, we obtain a two-party PFE with linear complexity that is simpler and more efficient than that of [KM11] (see Section 5.4 for details on the efficiency gain), and when implemented using our SN-OEP, the resulting protocol is concretely more efficient for most circuit sizes, since the number of public-key operations can be made independent of the circuit size (via OT extension). Our construction is both asymptotically and concretely more efficient than the previous work of [KS08a] based on universal circuits. It is concretely more efficient than Valiant's construction [Val76] . Table 3 summarizes concrete efficiency comparison of our two-party PFE with all previous constructions. In appendix J.1 we show that our construction concretely improves over all previous construction for benchmark circuits such as AES, RSA and Edit-distance. Linear 2PC for Arithmetic Circuits. We also apply our framework to the construction for secure computation of arithmetic circuits based on a homomorphic encryption [CDN01] , and obtain the first two-party PFE for arithmetic circuits with linear complexity. Besides utilizing our F CT H realizations, we instantiate the F PGE functionality by designing a secure gate evaluation protocol wherein only one party knows/learns the functionality (multiplication or addition) but both parties learn their share of the output (product or sum).
2-Party PFE

Complexity
Concrete Efficiency Gain [KS08a] 1.5g log 2 g sym. . Last column shows concrete gain of our 2-PFE over universal circuit approaches for benchmark circuits, AES, RSA and Edit-distance (refer to section J.1 for more detailed discussion). g denotes the number of gates, and k is the security parameter.
Preliminaries
Notations. For a set D, we denote its size by |D|. We use the same notation to show the size (number of gates) of a circuit C. We denote a vector by v. We use [a] to denote secret sharing of a value a among multiple parties. We intentionally do not specify the sharing scheme used. In our constructions we use a number of different schemes such as XOR sharing, and additive sharing over a finite ring. We denote the ith party's shared by [a] i . We use {1...n} to denote the set of positive integers less than equal to n.
Homomorphic Encryption. We use a semantically-secure public-key encryption scheme E = (Gen, Enc, Dec) with public key pk that allows for simple computations on encrypted data. We require the scheme to be additively homomorphic and denote the addition operation by + h such that Enc pk (m 1 + m 2 ) = Enc pk (m 1 ) + h Enc pk (m 2 ). Furthermore, given Enc pk (m) and a plaintext c,there exist an efficient operations denoted by × h such that Enc pk (cm) = c × h Enc pk (m).
Generalized Switching Networks. A switching network SN is a set of interconnected switches that takes N inputs and a set of selection bits, and outputs N values. Each switch in the network accepts two -bits strings as input and outputs two -bit strings. In our generalized notion of a switch, each of the two output strings can take the value of each of the two input strings. Therefore, assuming input values (x 0 , x 1 ), and output values (y 0 , y 1 ), four different switch types are possible. The two selection bits s 0 and s 1 determine the switch type. In particular, the output of the switch will be y 1 = x s 1 ,and y 0 = x s 0 . In the rest of the paper, we drop the term generalized and simply refer to these networks as switching networks.
Definition 2.1 (Mapping for a Switching Network). The mapping π : {1...N } → {1...N } corresponding to a switching network SN is defined such that π(i) = j if and only if after evaluation of SN on the N inputs, the value of the input wire i is assigned to the output wire j (assuming a standard numbering of the input/output wires).
Note that the mapping π need not be a function since the value for each input wire maybe mapped to multiple output wires in the network. On the other hand, π −1 is always a function.
Permutation Networks. A permutation network P N is a switching network for which the mapping is a permutation. In constructing a permutation network, one only needs to use two of the four switch types described above. Particularly, for each switch (also called a permutation cell) with inputs I 0 and I 1 , one selection bit is sufficient to select between the two possible outputs (I 0 , I 1 ) and (I 1 , I 0 ).
An optimal construction for a permutation network was proposed by Waksman [Wak68] . The main theorem of [Wak68] states that for any N power of 2, there exists a permutation network with N log N − N + 1 switches, and depth of 2 log N − 1. We refer the reader to [Wak68] for the details of the construction which can be efficiently implemented with O(N log N ) complexity.
In the remainder of the paper, if a switch takes two selection bits, we refer to it as a 2-switch, and otherwise we use the term 1-switch. Security Definitions. Security definitions are given in Appendix A.
Our Framework for Designing PFE Protocols
Similar to the previous work on private function evaluation, we assume that the following information about the circuit is publicly known: the number of gates in the circuit, the number of each party's input wires, and the number of output wires. Everything else about the circuit is considered private information. We aim to hide the circuit through the CTH and PGE functionalities discussed earlier. In this section we formally describe these functionalities and explain how they can be combined to obtain a PFE.
Our interpretation of sharing (denote using []) in the following discussion is very general. In the GMWbased PFE we use XOR sharing, for arithmetic circuits we use additive shares over a finite ring, and in Yao's garbled circuit, one party holds one random key (in a key pair) while the other party holds the mapping of each key to its actual bit value. CTH Functionality. As described in the introduction, the interconnection of wires in the circuit can be represented by a mapping π C . The CTH functionality is responsible for obliviously applying this mapping to the values of the input wires and the intermediate wires in the circuit, in an on-demand fashion. Our definition of the CTH functionality captures this useful property refered to as on-demand mapping via use of the OMAP/Reveal queries. The OMAP queries allow the participants in the CTH to feed their shares of the values for each outgoing wire to the mapping (individually) and obtain the mapped/blinded outcomes for each incoming wire through the Reveal queries. Our new realization of the CTH functionality as well as the existing constructions all possess the on-demand property as discussed in Appendix G. Figure 2 describes the CTH functionality more formally.
The role of vectors k is to prevent P 1 from learning the other parties' shares and the role of vectors t is to hide P 1 's mapping π C from the other parties. The operator ⊗ is used to denote a blinding operation. Depending on the CTH realization, the blinding operation can be XORing, modular addition, or homomorphic addition using an additively homomorphic encryption.
The PGE Functionality. The PGE functionality can be seen as a PFE protocol where the function is a single gate. A formal description is given in Figure 3 .
Our PFE Framework. These two functionalities can be naturally composed to obtain a complete PFE protocol as described in Figure 4 . Our framework can be seen as a way to extend a PFE protocol for one gate (PGE) to a PFE protocol for the complete circuit (by employing the CTH functionality). We give an overview next. In the initialization phase, P 1 , knowing the circuit C, sorts the gates topologically and computes the mapping π C corresponding to it. Next, each party distributes shares of its input to all parties. The idea is for the parties to send the value of each outgoing wire to the CTH functionality as soon as it is ready. Hence, at the start of the protocol they send shares of their input values to F CT H (the input wires are the first set of outgoing wires in the circuit). The F CT H maps these values to the corresponding incoming wires (through OMAP queries). This ends the initialization phase. Parties then individually evaluate the gates. For the current gate being evaluated, parties obtain their shares for the two input values using two Reveal queries to the F CT H . Next, parties invoke the PGE functionality to receive fresh random shares for the output of the current gate. Parties send these newly learnt shares to The F CT H functionality with circuit parameters n (number of input wires), g (number of gates), o (number of output wires), and internal variables Out[i, j] for 1 ≤ i ≤ m and 1 ≤ j ≤ 2g where m is the number of parties, and Out[i, j] denote P i 's share for the value of the j-th incoming wire in the circuit.
Parties Setup: P 1 computes the mapping π C corresponding to circuit C. He also generates m random
On Queries: OMAP([x], j):
for all l where π C (j) = l. Other parties do not receive any output.
Reveal(j): Figure 3 : The Private Gate Evaluation Functionality (F PGE ) P 1 's Inputs: The circuit C with g gates, n input wires, and o output gates. Denote the corresponding mapping by π C . P i 's Input (1 ≤ i ≤ m): x j for all input wires j in the circuit belonging to P i . Outputs: For 1 ≤ i ≤ m, P i learns his share of the values for the output wires.
Initialization:
1. P 1 sort the gates in the circuit, topologically. Denote the ordered gates by G 1 , . . . , G g . 2. For 1 ≤ i ≤ m, P i distributes shares of his inputs among all parties. 3. For 1 ≤ j ≤ n, parties make the query OMAP([x j ], j) to the F CT H .
Private Function Evaluation:
For 1 ≤ j ≤ g: Theorem 3.1. Given secure realizations of F CT H and F PGE against semi-honest adversaries, the above PFE framework is secure against semi-honest adversaries.
Realizing the CTH Functionality via OEP
What is an Extended Permutation? Before describing our construction in more detail, we need to explain the notion of an extended permutation. Recall that a mapping π : {1...N } → {1...N } is a permutation if it is a bijection (i.e. one-to-one and onto). An extended permutation generalizes this notion as follows:
Definition 4.1 (Extended Permutation). For positive integers M and N , we call a mapping π : {1...M } → {1...N } an extended permutation (EP) if for every y ∈ {1...N } there is exactly one x ∈ {1...M } such that π(x) = y. We often denote x by π −1 (y).
Note that in an extended permutation, unlike a standard permutation mapping, the mapping can also replicate/omit elements (as many times as needed) hence allowing the range to be larger or smaller than the domain.
CTH and The OEP Problem. To realize the CTH functionality we have to implement n+g −o OMAP queries, one for each outgoing wire, and 2g Reveal queries, one for each incoming wire. When combined, these OMAP/Reveal queries naturally form a problem we refer to as oblivious evaluation of the extended permutation (OEP). We define the two-party OEP problem here. In Appendix F, we describe a natural generalization of the problem to the m-party case and show how to efficiently realize it using m invocations of the two-party variant (wee need the multiparty variant for our GMW-based PFE).
Definition 4.2 (The Two-party OEP Problem: 2-OEP(π, x, t)). In this problem, the first party P 1 holds an extended permutation π : {1...M } → {1...N } for two positive integers M and N , and a blinding vector t = (t 1 , . . . , t N ) while the second party P 2 holds a vector of inputs x = (x 1 , . . . , x M ). Both the x i s and t i s arebit strings where is a positive integer. At the end of the protocol, P 2 learns (x π −1 (1) ⊕t 1 , . . . , x π −1 (N ) ⊕t N ) 3 , while P 1 does not learn anything.
Existing Solutions and Their Efficiency. The two existing solutions for OEP are based on generalpurpose MPC (e.g. Yao's garbled circuit) and based on any additively homomorphic encryption. We refer the reader to Appendix C for more detail on these solutions and their efficiency. Asymptotically speaking, the construction based on homomorphic encryption has linear complexity and hence is superior to the Yao-based one. Interestingly, however, the Yao-based solution seems to be the more efficient of the two in practice, for many values of interest for N and . In particular, the experiments in [HEK12] show that despite the asymptotic efficiency of the solution based on homomorphic encryption, for values of 128 < N < 8192, and with = 32, the garbled circuit implementation of the Waksman network is more than 7 times faster than the homomorphic-based shuffling (See Section 7.2 of [HEK12] ). Though the above experiments were done for the special case of oblivious shuffling, the same efficiency analysis holds in the more general case of OEP.
A New OEP Protocol
Next, we design a novel OEP protocol that improves on the efficiency of the above constructions. First, we show how to efficiently implement any extended permutation using a switching network. Then, we design a new and efficient protocol for oblivious evaluation of a switching network (OSN).
Building EPs out of Switching Networks. We first show how to construct an extended permutation using a switching network. Note that in a switching network, the number of inputs and outputs are the same which is in contrast to an extended permutation. Since for circuits we only deal with the case of N ≥ M , the switching network we build for simulating an extended permutation π : {1...M } → {1...N }, takes M real inputs of the EP and N − M additional dummy inputs.
We divide the switching network into three components: (i) dummy-value placement, (ii) replication, and (iii) permutation (See Figure 5 ). Each component takes the output of the previous one as input.
• Dummy-value placement component. takes the real and dummy values as input and for each real input that is mapped to k different outputs according to π, outputs the real value followed by k − 1 dummy values. This is repeated for each real value. This process can be efficiently implemented using a Waksman permutation network.
• Replication component. takes the output of the previous component as input. It directly outputs each real value but replaces each dummy input with the real input that precedes it. Each replacement can be implemented using a 1-switch (with a single selection bit) choosing between rows 1 and 3 of Figure 5 (a), as discussed in Section 2. The entire replication phase can be implemented using N − 1 such switches. At the end of this step, we have the necessary copies for each real input and the dummy inputs are eliminated.
• Permutation component. takes the output of the replication component as input and permutes each element to its final location as prescribed by π. Once again, this can be efficiently implemented using a Waksman permutation network.
Size of the Switching Network for an EP. Adding up the three components, the total of number of 1-switches needed to implement the extended permutation described above is 2(N log N − N + 1) + N − 1 = 2N log N − N + 1.
Oblivious Evaluation of Switching Networks (OSN). Next, we design a new and efficient protocol for oblivious evaluation of a generalized switching network. In this problem, P 2 holds the input vector x while P 1 holds the selection bits into the switching network, and a blinding vector t. P 2 learns the output of the network on his vector x blinded using vector t. We start with a high level overview. A complete description appears in Figure 8 of Appendix D. Secure evaluation of a single 2-switch. The idea can be best explained by describing the procedure for secure evaluation of a single 2-switch u in the network. Consider a 2-switch with input wires w i and w j and output wires w k and w l . P 2 assigns four uniformly random values r i , r j , r k , r l to the four wires. P 1 holds the blinded values x i ⊕ r i and x j ⊕ r j for the two input wires. The goal is to let P 1 learn the blinded values for the output wires (see Figure 5 ). Particularly, depending on the value of his two selection bits s 0 (u) and s 1 (u), P 1 learns one of the four possible output pairs:
To implement this step, P 2 creates a table with four rows: (r i ⊕r k , r j ⊕r l ), (r i ⊕r k , r i ⊕r l ), (r j ⊕r k , r i ⊕r l ), and (r j ⊕ r k , r j ⊕ r l ) as shown in step 4 of Figure 8 . Then, P 1 and P 2 engage in a 1-out-of-4 oblivious transfer in which P 2 's input is the four rows of the table he just created, and P 1 's input is his two selection bits for the switch u. Without loss of generality suppose that P 1 's selection bits are 0, and 0. Hence, P 1 retrieves the first row in the table, i.e. (r i ⊕ r k , r j ⊕ r l ). He then XORs x i ⊕ r i and r i ⊕ r k to recover x i ⊕ r k and XORs x j ⊕ r j and r j ⊕ r l to recover x j ⊕ r l , i.e. the blinded values for the output wires.
Evaluating the entire switching network. The above protocol can be extended to securely evaluate the entire switching network in constant round. In an offline stage, P 2 generates a set of random values for every wire in the network, and computes a table for each as described above. Then, P 1 and P 2 engage in a series of parallel 1-out-of-4 oblivious transfers, one for each switch, where P 1 learns a single row of each table according to his selection bits.
In the online stage, P 2 blinds his input vector using the randomness for the input wires, and sends them to P 1 . P 1 now has all the information necessary to evaluate the switches in the network in a topological order, and recover the blinded values for the output wires (at this stage, P 1 locally performs a sequence of XORs discussed above). He then applies an additional layer of blinding using his random vector t, and returns the result to P 2 . P 2 can remove his own blinding (i.e. the randomness he generated for the output wires in the network) to learn the output of the switching network blinded only with P 1 's vector t.
The above OSN protocol runs in a constant number of rounds and requires one invocation of an oblivious transfer per switch in the network. See Appendix D for a more detailed discussion of its efficiency. We also prove the following theorem in Appendix E. Efficiency of the new OEP. We can now evaluate the efficiency of the OEP protocol that results from applying our OSN construction to the switching network corresponding to an EP. As discussed earlier, the total number of switches needed to implement an extended permutation π : {1...M } → {1...N } is 2N log N − N + 1. Furthermore, we only need to use 1-switches to implement an EP which means we only need 1-out-of-2 OT as opposed 1-out-of-4 OT. This yields an OEP protocol with O(k) public-key operations and 4N log N − 2N + 2 symmetric-key operations. The communication of the protocol is dominated by O(N log N ) hash values.
Both our protocol and the Yao-based solution are constant round, and when OT extension is used, require the same number of public-key operations O(k). 4 However, the number of symmetric-key operations in our construction for a single Waksman network is 2N log N − 2N + 2 compared to the garbled circuit approach of [HEK12] which requires 4 (N log N − N + 1)/3 + 2N symmetric-key operations (assuming each non-free gate requires four symmetric-key operations) 5 . This is a significant improvement specially as one considers larger values of . For example for = 32 (which is used for comparison in [HEK12] ) our OSN protocol implementing the Waksman network, is approximately 25 times faster. Considering that the Yao-based solution is 7 times faster than HE-based shuffling, we obtain a factor of 175 efficiency gain over the HE-based approach. The bandwidth usage of our construction is also better by the same factors. An additional advantage of our construction is a very cheap online phase that does not require any cryptographic operations and only consists of XOR operations. For the same parameters, our SN-OEP construction is 161 times faster than HE-based OEP. For a detailed discussion refer to Appendix D. How OSN Realizes F CT H Queries. It remains to show how our OSN implementation of OEP realizes the queries in F CT H . While it is obvious that our OSN protocol securely performs all the OMAP/Reveal queries combined, for it to fully satisfy the CTH, we need the ability to make these queries on-demand. The On-demand property of the OSN protocol is discussed in Appendix G.
Efficient PFEs From MPC
Multi-Party Private Function Evaluation
In this section we apply our framework to the seminal GMW protocol to obtain a multi-party PFE variant. In particular, we need to describe how the CTH and the PGE functionalities are designed and then plug them into the framework to obtain the desired multiparty PFE.
We implement the PGE functionality by means of a multi-party private gate evaluation (m-XOR-PGE(G, a, b)) protocol. In such a protocol, only P 1 knows the functionality of the gate G while each party holds his XOR share of the input bits a and b and obtains his XOR share of the output bit G(a, b). In Appendix H we show a simple construction for this problem based on any multiparty OT (e.g. see [FGM07] ).
The protocol requires the same number of OTs as a single gate evaluation in the standard GMW. Hence, making the gate functionality private comes for free in terms of computation or communication.
For the CTH functionality, we can use the multiparty variant of either the HE-OEP or the SN-OEP constructions discussed earlier, where each party uses his XOR shares of the outgoing wires as input to the OEP and obtains his share of the value for the incoming wires.
The following theorem is implied by the security of our framework (Theorem 3.1), secure instantiations of the OEP and the PGE functionalities and a standard sequential composition theorem [Can00] .
Theorem 5.1. Given that the OEP and m-XOR-PGE protocols are secure against semi-honest adversaries, the Multi-Party PFE protocol based on our framework is also secure against semi-honest adversaries.
Efficiency. The resulting protocol requires a single invocation of the m-OEP protocol (even though the protocol is executed in an on-demand fashion), and one invocation of the m-XOR-PGE per gate. Using the HE-OPE instantiation, we obtain a protocol with linear complexity (linear number of exponentiations), and using the SN-OPE, we obtain a protocol that uses O(m 2 g + mg log g) invocations of OT (O(m 2 g) for the PGE and O(mg log g) for the OEP). The number of rounds is equal to the number of gates since they are evaluated sequentially.
Private Function evaluation for Arithmetic Circuits
In this section we apply the same framework to secure 2PC for arithmetic circuits. In order to hide the functionality of the gate, we design a PGE protocol in which P 2 's actions are independent of the functionality of the gate (i.e. addition or multiplication). To achieve this, P 2 sends to
Given these three ciphertexts, P 1 can compute an encryption of both the sum and the product of a and b using homomorphic properties of the scheme. He then sends an encrypted random shares of the outcome to P 1 to decrypt. A detailed description of the protocol appears in Appendix I. It is easy to see that the protocol is secure again semi-honest adversaries if the encryption scheme is semantically secure. We omit the proof of the following theorem.
Theorem 5.2. Given E = (Gen, Enc, Dec) a semantically secure encryption scheme, 2-Arith-PGE protocol is secure against semi-honest adversaries.
We plug in the above PGE and our HE-OEP protocols in our general framework to obtain an efficient and secure 2PC for arithmetic circuits with linear complexity. The following theorem is implied by the security of our framework (Theorem 3.1), secure instantiations of the OEP and the PGE functionalities and a standard sequential composition theorem [Can00] .
Theorem 5.3. Given that the OEP and 2-Arith-PGE protocols are secure against semi-honest adversaries, the 2-Party Arithmetic PFE protocol based on our framework is secure against semi-honest adversaries.
Efficiency. Each PGE invocation requires a constant number of public-key operations adding up to a total of O(g) public-key operations. The HE-OEP has a linear complexity leading to a PFE protocol with similar complexity. The number of rounds is equal to the number of gates since they are evaluated sequentially.
A Constant-round Two-party PFE
In this section we apply the PFE framework to Yao's garbled circuit protocol. We only describe the high level ideas here. A full description of the protocol (2-PFE) appears in Figure 10 . At first sight, it may not be obvious how to interpret the sharing mechanism in Yao's protocol. But a closer look at the garbling and evaluation steps reveals that the bit value a for a wire in the circuit is shared by having P 2 (garbler) hold the mapping of a pair of random keys to their bit value (k 0
General Idea. Recall Yao's garbled circuit protocol in the semi-honest case. In our construction, the evaluator is the party who holding the circuit, while we intend to hide the circuit from the garbler. We need to hide the topology of the circuit from him using the CTH functionality: first, the Garbler generates his own random shares for the output wires of all the gates in the circuit (i.e. the permuted garbled key pairs for all those wires). Next, he sends all his shares to the CTH functionality, and receives his output which are his shares for the input wires to all the gates in the circuit (i.e. garbled key pairs for all those wires). The garbler now has all garbled keys he needs to garbled circuit. If we assume that all the gates are NAND, there would be no need to hide the gates functionalities. Therefore, our F PGE functionality realization consists of the normal garbling of the gate by the garbler and the standard evaluation of the gates by the evaluator. Next, we go into the details of each component and address some of the subtleties that arise.
PGE realization. Realization of the F PGE functionality is simple. Lets assume that the inputs are shared using the above sharing scheme. P 2 first randomly generates his own share of the output wire for the current gate, which is basically generating two random keys and assigning them to bits zero and one. He then sends his share to CTH functionality. Upon receiving his shares for input wires to the gates, from CTH functionality, P 2 garbles each gate using his shares for the input and output wires of the gate. He then sends the garbled gates to P 1 who can use his own share of the input wires to ungarble a single row and learn his own share of the output wire.
We now need to integrate our CTH realization with the above PGE construction. For this to work, we need to modify our standard CTH realization, particularly to make sure that its outputs are fresh shares based on the sharing scheme above (i.e.
[a] 1 and [a] 2 , and the key pair are fresh and random).
Achieving constant round protocol. Given a correct CTH realization, it is possible to design a constant-round version of the protocol. Note that P 2 's shares for all the outgoing wires can be generated by him at random and in the beginning of the protocol (without interaction with P 1 ). At this stage, parties can indeed execute the CTH functionality in its entirety for P 2 to learn his fresh random shares for the 2g incoming wires to the circuit. The only difference comparing to our framework is that P 1 does not learn his shares for the intermediate wires until later (in the evaluation). Also, note that P 2 's portion of PGE is only based on his own randomly generated shares and thus can be done at once and without interaction with P 1 for each gate. In particular, he garbles all the gates using the keys he obtained from the CTH functionality and sends the garbled gates to P 1 . P 1 then performs his portion of the gate evaluation, evaluating the gates in topological order to obtain his share of each incoming wire and eventually the output wires. During the evaluation (ungarbling) phase, when P 1 retrieves a garbled key for an output of a gate in the circuit, he needs to XOR it with its corresponding blinding value(s) to obtain his correct input share for evaluating
5. P 2 starts the Yao's garbled circuits using these values as key Figure 6 : CTH realization of our 2-PFE protocol, applied to the example of figure 1. the next garbled gate. Since P 1 knows π C and all the blinding values, he has the necessary information to perform this step. He then asks P 2 for his share of the output wires of the circuit (i.e. the translation table in standard Yao) to determine his actual output. P 1 's shares of his inputs wires are delivered to him using one OT per wire (as done in standard Yao).
CTH realization.
During the evaluation, P 1 needs to XOR his share with its corresponding blinding value(s) to obtain his correct input share for evaluating the next garbled gate. But observing which blinding value enables correct decryption of the next garbled gate (potentially) reveals the value of that intermediate wire.
To avoid this issue, we need to ensure that the shares generated by the CTH are truly random. In particular, we need to ensure that P 1 cannot the first blinding to the key 0 and the second blinding with key 1. As a first solution, P 2 randomly swaps the key pairs to prevent such association by P 1 .
• P 2 swaps each key pair randomly. We solve this problem by having P 2 swap each key pair randomly and independently (using a random bit-vector v) before using them in the OMAP queries (for the CTH). Steps 1 and 2 of figure 6 demonstrate this fix. Each pair should be swapped using a different bit since using the same bit would reveal whether the bit values for certain intermediate wires are the same or not. If the first(second) blinding is used for two or more wires we learn that their value is the same, though we don't know if it zero or one. This solves the issue above, but undermines correctness of the protocol. When P 2 sends the swapped key pairs to P 1 , he gets back an extended permuted (and blinded) set of key pairs. As a result, P 2 does not know the correct order for each pair, and will not be able to perform the garbling of the gates without knowing which key is for 0 and which is for 1.
• P 1 and P 2 jointly swap each key pair into its original form. A naive fix would be to attach each "swapping bit" to its corresponding key pair as it goes through the CTH, and reveal the bit to P 2 as part of the output of the CTH, who then uses it to swap the key pair back to its original order. But this would allow P 2 to learn some information about π C (and the topology of the circuit) by comparing the swapping bits in the input and output key pairs for the CTH.
To address this issue, P 1 and P 2 perform this step together, each holding an XOR share of swapping bits. In particular, the random bit vector v will be fed to the CTH (see step 4a of the protocol), but P 2 only learns a blinded version, i.e. v i = v π −1 (i) ⊕ v i for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2g, where the blinding vector v = (v 1 , . . . , v 2g ) is only known to P 1 . To swap each key pair back to its original order, P 1 first swaps the pair using v i (step 3 of figure 6), and sends it to P 2 . P 2 then swaps it one more time using v i which puts the key pair back in its original order (step 4 of figure 6 ). Of course, at this point, the key shares are fresh and random.
If we use a homomorphic-based OEP, this solution is sufficient (see section 5.4), but when using the CTH functionality in a black-box way, and particularly when using our SN-OEP construction, there is one more issue to address. The described solution does not use the OEP in a black-box fashion, since P 1 needs to swap the outcome using v , before sending it to P 2 . But if the pair is swapped using a random bit vector not known to P 2 , he cannot use the appropriate random values to unblind the result (recall the final step of the OEP where P 2 removes his blinding from the output).
• P 1 does his swapping using an OSN protocol. To handle this problem, we require that P 1 's swapping procedure based on the bit-vector v takes place as part of an oblivious switching network evaluation where the v i s are P 1 's selection bits to the network. This requires the use of an additional layer of switches attached to the original switching network for the OEPs (see Figure 11 of Appendix J). This also has the advantage of making the usage of the OEP and the OSN protocols black-box.
We prove the following theorem in Appendix J.2.
Theorem 5.4. Given that the OSN and the OEP protocols are secure against semi-honest adversaries, and that Yao's protocol uses a symmetric-key encryption with related-key security, the 2-PFE protocol is secure against semi-honest adversaries.
Further Optimizations and Efficiency
Combining the switching networks into one. For ease of composition, and to make the constructions conceptually easier to understand, in Figure 10 we describe four separate switching networks, one for the OEP , and three for SN 0 ,SN 1 , and SN 2 . But since SN 0 and SN 1 implement π c , we can use a single switching network that concatenates their inputs. As a result, the computation (number of oblivious transfers) reduces by a factor of two. The switching network SN 2 still needs to be evaluated separately.
A simpler protocol based on homomorphic encryption. As mentioned earlier, the switching network SN 2 is not needed when we implement the OSN using a homomorphic encryption scheme. The intuition is that P 2 can still decrypt the outcome of the OSN protocol without knowing the correct swapping bit used by P 1 6 . The resulting 2-PFE is more efficient than the protocol of Katz and Malka [KM11] . The main reason is that we blind each key by homomorphically adding a random value to it, while they need to apply a universal hashing procedure that requires both a homomorphic addition and a multiplication to blind each key. This is a noticeable improvement since homomorphic multiplication is often more expensive as it requires exponentiation. The reason for the universal hashing is to allow P 1 to evaluate the garbled circuit without learning the values for the intermediate wires (the same hashing is applied to both keys in the pair). But, we solve this problem via use of swapping bit vectors ( v, v ), which can be concatenated to the end of each key pair as it is being encrypted, hence avoiding any additional cost.
Efficiency of the SN-OEP instantiation.
When using our SN-OEP in the above construction, the total number of symmetric operations required for the protocol is 8g log 2g+5g+2. We discuss the efficiency in detail in Appendix J.1 and show that our protocol is a factor of 142 more efficient than the PFE protocol of [KM11] , , for wide range of circuit sizes. We also show that it is 2 times more efficient than applying Yao's garbled circuits to Valiant's universal circuit construction, and 3-6 times faster than applying Yao's garbled circuits to universal circuit construction of [KS08a] , for the benchmark circuits such as AES, RSA and Edit-distance. For the latter two constructions, we assume that they take full advantage of free XOR gates and in particular that 3/4 of the gates in the Universal circuit are XOR gates that computed for free. A Security Definitions
A.1 Oblivious Transfer
Our protocols use Oblivious Transfer (OT) as a building block. Since we focus on protocols that run in constant rounds, we describe an abstraction for a one-round OT protocol here. A One-round OT involves a server holding a list of t secrets (s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s t ), and a client holding a selection index i. The client sends a query q to the server who responds with an answer a. Using a and its local secret, the client is able to recover s i . More formally, a one-round 1-out-of-t oblivious transfer (OT t 1 ) protocol is defined by a tuple of P P T algorithms OT t 1 = (G OT , Q OT , A OT , D OT ). The protocol involves two parties, a client and a server where the server's input is a t-tuple of strings (s 1 , . . . , s t ) of length τ each, and the client's input is an index i ∈ [t]. The parameters t and τ are given as inputs to both parties. The protocol proceeds as follows:
1. The client generates (pk, sk) ← G OT (1 k ), computes a query q ← Q OT (pk, 1 t , 1 τ , i), and sends (pk, q) to the server.
2. The server computes a ← A OT (pk, q, s 1 , . . . , s t ) and sends a to the client.
The client computes and outputs D OT (sk, a).
In case of semi-honest adversaries, many of the OT protocols in the literature are one-round, and secure against parallel compositions (e.g. see [NP01, Lip05, PVW08]).
A.2 Secure Two-party Computation
Let f = (f 1 , f 2 ) of the form f : {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * → {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * be a two party computation and Π be a two-party protocol for computing f between the parties p 1 and p 2 . The input of p 1 is x and the input of p 2 is y. We briefly review the simulation-based notion of security for secure two-party computation here, focusing on the case where the adversary is semi-honest.
A.2.1 Security Against Semi-Honest Adversaries
Readers can refer to [Gol04] for a detailed discussion. Security for a two-party computation is defined by requiring indistinguishability (either perfect, statistical or computational) between a real execution of the protocol and an ideal execution in which there is a TTP (trusted third party) who receives the parties input, evaluates the function and outputs the results to them. Consider a semi-honest and admissible adversary A. An admissible adversary is one that corrupts exactly one of the two party. A also knows an auxiliary input z. Without loss of generality we assume the A corrupts the first party.
In the real world, the honest party follows the description of protocol Π as instructed and responds to messages sent by A on behalf of the other party. Let view Π,A (x, y) denote A's view through this interaction, and let out Π (x, y) denote the output of the honest party. The execution of Π in the real model on input pair (x, y) is defined as follows:
In the ideal model, in which there is a TTP, both parties send their inputs to TTP. The trusted party replies with f 1 (x, y) to the first party and with f 2 (x, y) to the second party. The honest party outputs whatever is sent by the trusted party, and A outputs an arbitrary function of its view. Let out f,A (x, y) and out f (x, y) denote the output of A and the honest party respectively in the ideal model. The execution of Π in the ideal model on input pair (x, y) is defined as follow: A (x, y), out f (x, y) ) Definition A.1. We say that Π securely computes f in the presence of static malicious adversaries if for every pair of admissible non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time machinesĀ = (A 1 , A 2 ) in the real model, there exists a pair of admissible nonuniform probabilistic expected polynomial-time machinesB = (B 1 , B 2 ) in the ideal model, such that
Namely the two distributions are indistinguishable.
A.2.2 The OT hybrid model
We use the OT hybrid model to prove the security of our proposed protocols. In the OT hybrid model (e.g. see [Can00, LP07] ), it suffices to analyze the security of a protocol in a hybrid model in which the parties interact with each other and have access to a trusted party (ideal functionality) that computes the oblivious transfer protocol for them. This model is a hybrid of the real and ideal models: on the one hand, the parties send regular messages to each other, similar to the real model; on the other hand, the parties have access to a trusted party, similar to the ideal model.
B Proof of Security for the PFE Framework
We note that to make our PFE Framework conceptually simpler, we described it as a black-box construction based on the F CT H , and the F PGE functionalities. However, for the purpose of the security proof, it is useful to break down the F CT H functionality into a sequence of calls to the OMAP functionality, and replace calls to the Reveal queries with a message from P 1 to other parties with their blinded shares (which they can unblind). With this new interpretation, the whole framework can be seen as a series of sequential calls to the OMAP functionality and the PGE functionality. As a result, given the security of the framework with access to these ideal functionalities, and secure instantiation of each functionality, we can invoke the existing sequential composition theorems [Can00] to obtain security for the resulting PFE constructions. In light of this discussion, we prove security of our framework given access to the ideal OMAP and PGE functionalities.
Proof. Case 1: P 1 , . . . , P m−1 are corrupted.
Simulation. For any PPT adversary A 1 , controlling P 1 , . . . , P m−1 in the real world, we describe a simulator S 1 who simulates A 1 's view in the ideal world. S 1 runs A 1 on input shares of P 1 , . . . , P m−1 and circuit C (with mapping π C ).
1. S 1 sends the inputs of P 1 , . . . , P m−1 and the circuit C (part of P 1 's input to the TTP. It receives the o output values out 1 , . . . , out o , as the outcome of evaluating the circuit C on all the parties' input (including honest P m ).
2.
A 1 distributes shares of inputs for P 1 , . . . , P m−1 to S 1 . S 1 then generates a fake input on behalf of P m and distributes the shares of all parties by sending their shares to A 1 .
3. S 1 and A 1 send shares of the inputs they just distributed to the OMAP functionality. S 1 also sends a blinding vector k m on behalf of P m while A 1 sends a vector of blinding vectors t 1 , . . . , t m . As a result, A 1 receives blinded shares of a subset of the incoming wires in the circuit.
4. For 1 ≤ j ≤ g:
• A 1 sends the blinded shares he holds for the two incoming wires of gate G j to S 1 , which S 1 unblinds using k m to retrieve [a ] This ends the description of the simulator S 1 . Indistinguishability of the views. It is easy to see that the ideal and real distributions defined in Definitions of Appendix A.2.1 are indistinguishable. In particular, in both the real and the ideal worlds, all messages seen by A 1 are uniformly random shares except in the final step where shares of the output of the circuit are revealed. In the latter case, however, A 1 's view in both worlds consist of random shares of the correct outputs values i.e. out 1 , . . . , out o . This completes the security argument for this corruption case.
All other corruption scenarios where P 1 is one of the corrupted parties, can be simulated in an identical fashion. It remains to show that efficient simulation is possible in the case where P 2 , . . . , P m are corrupted by the adversary.
Case 2: P 2 , . . . , P m are corrupted. the simulation in this case is essentially the same as the previous case. Note that in this case the simulator needs to play the role of honest P 1 , and consequently not only choose a fake input for P 1 but also create and use a fake circuit with n inputs, g gates and o outputs. But this does not effect the adversaries view as one again, he only sees random shares for all the intermediate wires, and the o outputs of the circuit. We omit the details of the proof for this case.
C Existing OEP Solutions and Their Complexity
We briefly review the existing methods for designing an OEP and compare their efficiency.
Using General-Purpose 2PC. Obviously, the OEP problem can be solved using any general 2PC protocol. For instance, one can first implement the functionality of an extended permutation using a switching network (we show how to do so in Section 4.1). Then, P 1 and P 2 can engage in a Yao's garbled circuit protocol where P 1 's inputs are the selection bits to the network and his blinding vector t, and P 2 's input is the input vector x. The boolean circuit being computed consists of the circuit for the switching network, and some additional gates to blind the network's output using t.
For an EP from M inputs to N outputs, the number of switches required in the switching network will be in the order of O(N log N ) which leads to a circuit with O(N log N ) gates; P 1 has O(N log N + N ) input bits in the circuit (O (N log N ) for the selection bits and O(N ) for the blinding vector), and P 2 has O(M ) input bits in the circuit.
Kolesnikov and Schneider [KS08a] , describe a construction for a similar circuit (called expanded permutation) as part of designing an efficient universal circuit. They also show how one can take advantage of the free-XOR optimization techniques [KS08b] in Yao's garbled circuit to reduce the number of non-free gates for each switch by 75%.
Katz et al. [HEK12] proposed a similar protocol for the special case of oblivious permutation network evaluation (referred to as a shuffling network in their paper). They use the Waksman [Wak68] switching network which consists of O(N log N ) switches, and employ oblivious swappers to implement each switch. Several optimization techniques are used to improve the implementation of these swappers in a garbled circuit construction. According to their estimates, the total number of non-free gates (i.e. total number of gates minus the number of XOR gates) for the whole circuit is (N log N − N + 1)/3 (See Table 1 of [HEK12] ).
Using Homomorphic Encryption (HE-OEP).
It is also possible to use a semantically secure singly homomorphic encryption scheme to design an OEP protocol. In this protocol P 2 , the party holding the input vector x generates and sends a public key pk for the scheme E = (Gen, Enc, Dec) to P 1 . P 2 then encrypts his inputs (x 1 , . . . , x M ) and sends them to P 1 : P 2 sends Enc pk (x 1 ), . . . , Enc pk (x |M | ) to P 1 P 1 in return applies the EP by replicating and permuting the received ciphertexts as prescribed by π C . He then uses the homomorphic properties of encryption scheme to add/multiply his blinding values and sends the result to P 2 .
P 2 decrypts the ciphertexts and recovers the final result. This approach requires O(N ) encryption/decryption and O(N ) homomorphic operations on the ciphertexts. Note that in the above construction, the blinding function is not necessarily an XOR operation. The exact operation depends on the particular homomorphic encryption scheme being used.
Efficiency Discussion. Asymptotically speaking, the construction based on homomorphic encryption has linear complexity and hence is superior to the Yao-based one. Interestingly, however, the Yao-based solution seems to be the more efficient of the two in practice, for many values of interest for N and . The latter conclusion is based on the recent experimental results provided in [HEK12] . In this paper, the authors implement an oblivious shuffling protocol using both approaches, and compare their efficiency. In particular, the authors show that despite the asymptotic efficiency of the solution based on homomorphic encryption, for values of 128 < N < 8192, and with = 32, the garbled circuit implementation of the Waksman network is more than 7 times faster than the homomorphic-based shuffling (See Section 7.2 of [HEK12] ). The homomorphic-based solution does not lead to any savings in the bandwidth either. Though the above analysis is done for permutation mappings, we note that the same efficiency analysis holds in the more general case of extended permutations.
D Complete Description of OSN Protocol
Efficiency of the OSN Protocol. We analyze, round, computation and communication complexity of the above protocol. Round complexity. Given that we can run the oblivious transfers in parallel, our protocol runs in one and a half rounds (three messages). P 1 sends his OT queries to P 2 . P 2 replies with the OT responses and his blinded inputs to P 1 . P 1 then evaluates the switching network and sends the blinded outputs back. Computation. The only cryptographic operation in the above OSN protocol is oblivious transfer. The number of 1-out-of-4 OTs is equal to the number of switches in the network, i.e. q. By employing the OT extension techniques [IKNP03] , this only requires O(k) public-key operations where k is a statistical security parameter, and O(q) symmetric-key operations (4q hash evaluations to be precise). Using the OT preprocessing techniques of [Bea95] , the above computation can be performed in an offline stage, and the online stage will only consist of O(q) XOR operations.
Efficiency of SN-OEP. The number of symmetric operations in our SN-OEP protocol is 4N log N − 2N + 2. To get a number of symmetric operations in Yao-OEP we use the number of gates required for a WN from [HEK12] and extend it to the full OEP, which would be (2N log N − N + 1)/3. This translates to 4 (N log N − N + 1)/3 + 2N symmetric operations. By plugging in the parameters from [HEK12] = 32, N = 128 and = 32, N = 8192, and comparing the number of symmetric operations we get an average of 23 time improvement over Yao-OEP. Considering that Yao-OEP is 7 times faster than HE-OEP, we get factor of 161 efficiency gain over HE-OEP.
E Security Proof for the OSN and the OEP Protocols
We show that as long the oblivious transfer protocol used is secure, so is our protocol. Particularly, if the OT is secure against semi-honest adversaries when executed in parallel, the OSN protocol described above is also secure against semi-honest adversaries.
The proof also implies the security of our OEP protocol since our OEP construction simply runs the OSN protocol on the switching network for the EP. The following Theorem formalizes this statement.
Theorem E.1. In the OT-hybrid model, the OSN protocol is secure against semi-honest adversaries.
Proof. Our proof follows the ideal/real world simulation paradigm.
Case 1: P 2 is corrupted. Simulation. For any PPT adversary A 2 , controlling P 2 in the real world, we describe a simulator S 2 who simulates A 2 's view in the ideal world. S 2 runs A 2 on x. This ends the description of the simulator S 2 . Indistinguishability of the views. We now show that the ideal and real distributions defined in Definitions of Appendix A.2.1 are indistinguishable. Since P 1 (the honest party) has no outputs in the OSN protocol, for the ideal distribution we have that,
In the real protocol, on the other hand, the actual selection bits of P 1 corresponding to the mapping π, and his actual blinding vector t is used, hence, the output A 2 receives is of the form
Since both the ideal and the real distribution consist of the blinded outputs (one blinded using P 1 's random blinding vector t and the other using S 2 's randomly generated blinding vector t ), the distributions are uniformly random, and identical.
Case 2: P 1 is corrupted. Simulation. For any PPT adversary A 1 , controlling P 1 in the real world, we describe a simulator S 1 who simulates A 1 's view in the ideal world. S 1 runs A 1 on π and the blinding vector t.
1. S 1 sends π and t to the TTP as his input. Honest P 2 will receive (
as his output from the TTP.
2. S 1 generates random values for every wire in the switching network as an honest P 2 would.
3. S 1 uses them to build a table T (u), for each switch u in the network.
4.
A 1 sends his selection bits as input to the OT ideal functionality. S 1 uses these selection bits to choose one of the four rows in each table.
5. S 1 randomly generates his inputs to the switching network (x 1 , . . . , x N ). He then blinds them using the random values he generated earlier for the input wires. Let's assume that the switching network is of depth d. We denote the list of the blinded inputs to the switching network by T r 0 , and the selected rows for each switch at layer i of the network by T r i for 1 ≤ i ≤ d. We also denote the entries in T r i by (T r i (1), . . . , T r i (h i )), where h i denotes the number of switches at depth i. S 1 sends (T r 0 , . . . , T r d ) to A 1 .
6. A 1 evaluates the switching network, and recovers x π −1 (i) ⊕ r i for 1 ≤ i ≤ N where r i s are the random values S 1 generated for the output wires of the network. A 1 blinds the output using his blinding vector t and sends
7. A 1 outputs his view, namely (π, t, (T r 0 , . . . , T r d )). S 1 does the same and halts.
This ends the description of the simulator S 1 . Indistinguishability of the views. We now show that the ideal and real distributions defined in Definitions of Appendix A.2.1 are indistinguishable. For the ideal execution of protocol we have:
The second part is P 2 's output in the OSN protocol which is the same in the real and ideal execution.
The real distribution is as follows
where the T r i s are created using the actual input of P 2 as opposed to fake inputs. We denote the IDEAL distribution by D , and the REAL distribution by D. We sequentially modify the REAL distribution until it is identical to the IDEAL one. We let D Next, we describe a protocol for multi-party OEP. The protocol consists of n − 1 two-party OEPs, between P 1 and P i (1 ≤ i ≤ n). Details follow:
Multi-Party Oblivious Extended Permutation (m-OEP(π, x)) P 1 's Inputs: An extended permutation π : {1...M } → {1...N }. Shared Inputs: For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, P i holds x i , his XOR share of the input vector x = (x 1 , . . . , x M ). Shared Output: For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, P i holds his XOR share of the output vector O = (x π −1 (1) , . . . , x π −1 (N ) ).
1. P 1 applies π to his share of the input vector x 1 , to retrieve a vector y 1 of N elements.
2. For 2 ≤ j ≤ n (a) P 1 generates a uniformly random blinding vector t i = (t i 1 , . . . , t i N ). (b) P 1 and P i engage in a 2-OEP(π, x i , t i ), as a result of which P i learns the vector y i = (
3. P 1 computes his share of the output vector: y 1 ⊕ 2≤j≤n t j .
4. For 2 ≤ j ≤ n, P j already holds his share of the output vector, i.e. y j .
For correctness, it is easy to verify that XORing the shares of everyone's output yields the desired output O. The complexity of the protocol is exactly a factor of n − 1 more than the two-party variant. This yields a protocol with exactly (n − 1)(4N log N − 2N + 4) oblivious transfers. Furthermore, using standard sequential composition theorems for MPC, the security of the m-OEP protocol follows in a straightforward manner from the security of our 2-OEP protocol (discussed in Appendix E). We only state the theorem.
Theorem F.2. The m-OEP protocol is secure against a semi-honest adversary who may corrupt upto n − 1 parties, if the 2-OEP is secure against semi-honest adversaries.
G On-Demand Property of CTH Realizations
It is easy to see that our OSN protocol provides this feature. Once the offline phase of the protocol is completed, we can consider an alternative way of evaluating the switching network by P 1 . For each input/output pair of the network, when P 1 receives the blinded value for the input, he can evaluate a single path in the switching network to compute the blinded output value. In order to do so, P 1 needs to follow the path that the input takes as it goes through the switches in the network (P 1 knows the selection bit vector and hence knows the path).
SN-OEP:
• OMAP([x], j) query: Receive the jth input from ith party and for each j such that π C (j) = l, does the on-demand evaluation between j and l and sets
• Reveal(j) query: Sends Out[i, j] to P i .
An OEP protocol based on homomorphic encryption also has the on-demand evaluation property.
Security of SN-OEP Realization of OMAP Query. As mentioned each OMAP query is equivalent to an on-demand evaluation of one input. In other words, we are able to realize each OMAP query individually using on-demand evaluation property of SN-OEP construction.
The security of each OMAP query follows from our proof of OSN protocol (See Appendix E). Particularly, for the case where P 2 is corrupted, since he only observes the final values which are blinded by P 1 , it is the same as the case where we are doing all OMAP queries together and both Ideal and Real distributions are uniformly random and therefore indistinguishable. For the case where P 1 is corrupted, we can follow the same indistinguishability argument in the proof. In fact, if we only follow the path from outputs (all l such that π C (j) = l) to input (j) in the network, we can make the same argument with the difference that in each layer, only the values which belong to these paths are in the views. Therefore, we can see our SN-OEP protocol as a combination of independent OMAP queries implemented together, while maintaining their security individually.
HE-OEP:
• OMAP([x], j) query: Receive the jth input from ith party and for each j such that π C (j) = l, sets
The more efficient Yao-based solution does not provide this capability since all the inputs to the garbled circuit need to be available to the circuit evaluator to be able to compute even a single output.
H Multiparty Private Gate Evaluation
We now describe a multiparty protocol for secure evaluation of a single gate G, where only P 1 knows the functionality of G, and everyone holds their share of the two inputs bits a and b to the gate. The goal is to have everyone learn their share of G(a, b). To design such a protocol, we take advantage of a natural generalization of oblivious transfer to the multiparty case, where both the inputs and the outputs are shared. Such a generalization has already been considered, e.g. in [FGM07] where a simple and black-box construction based on any two-party OT is also presented. Roughly speaking, their protocol requires the execution of a two-party OT between P 1 and each party P i (i > 1). We only define multiparty OT here, and use it in a black-box manner. We refer the readers to [FGM07] for the details of the construction and its security.
Definition H.1 (multiparty oblivious transfer: m-OT m (σ, ∆)). A multiparty oblivious transfer (m-OT) is a protocol involving n parties where: at the beginning of the protocol, each party holds a share of a secret index σ and one distinguished party (P 1 ) holds a table of m bits, the database ∆ = (δ 0 , . . . , δ m−1 ); at the end of the protocol, each party holds a share of the database element δ σ . In the terminology of oblivious transfer, every party is a receiver and one party is also the sender.
Our private gate evaluation protocol easily follows from such multiparty OT.
Multi-Party Private Gate Evaluation (m-XOR-PGE(G, a, b)) P 1 's Inputs: A gate G. Shared Inputs: For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, P i holds a i , and b i , his XOR shares of the two input bits a and b. Shared Output: For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, P i holds his XOR share of the output bit G(a, b).
1. P 1 creates the truth table ∆ for the gate G: Our m-XOR-PGE protocol requires a single invocation of a multiparty OT. Each multiparty OT itself requires the invocation of n − 1 OTs. This is equal to the number of OTs needed to evaluate a single gate in the standard GMW. Hence, making the gates private does not require additional computation or communication.
The correctness and security of the m-XOR-PGE protocol directly follows from that of the multiparty OT.
Theorem H.2. The m-XOR-PGE protocol is secure against a semi-honest adversary who may corrupt upto n − 1 parties. I 2-Arith-PGE J Description and Efficiency of 2-PFE Protocol and Proof of Security J.1 Efficiency of the Yao-based PFE Overall efficiency. In addition to the cost of Yao's garbled circuit protocol which requires O(g) symmetrickey operations and O( ) oblivious transfers, our protocol needs to execute a single OEP protocol, and a single OSN protocol. Using the optimizations mentioned above (for combining three switching networks), the total number of switches are 4g log 2g − 2g + 1 + 2g = 4g log 2g + 1, which leads to the same number of oblivious transfers. With the use of OT extension, this requires 8g log 2g + 2 symmetric-key operations (two for each OT), and yields a two-party PFE with 8g log 2g + 5g + 2 symmetric-key operations (assuming that each gate in Yao's protocol requires four encryptions).
Comparison to construction of [KM11] . We now show a concrete (but rough) comparison of our two-party PFE with the protocol of [KM11] . Note that for input sizes ranging form 128 to 8192, their homomorphic-based OEP requires at least a factor of 7 more work than the Yao-based solutions (as discussed in Appendix C, and in [HEK12] ), and as discussed in Appendix our solution improves on the Yao-based solutions by a factor of 23. This yields a factor of 161 improvement for the OEP component. The garbled circuit evaluation in both our protocol and theirs has the same cost and requires at most 5g (4g for garbling, g for evaluation using point and permute) symmetric-key operations. Note that since the cost both our solution and HE-based solution does not grow with size of input to 80-bits which is the minimum security required for Yao, we still use 161 in our analysis here. To compute the efficiency gain we have to compute the following equation: (averaged for g = 128 and g = 8192)
HE-OEP + Yao SN-OEP + 4g + Yao = 161(SN-OEP) + Yao SN-OEP + 4g + Yao = 161(8g log 2g − 4g + 2) + 5g 8g log 2g − 4g + 2 + 4g + 5g ≈ 142
This shows a factor of 142 or more improvement in the total work of our two-party PFE compared to [KM11] . Note that the OT extension can be used to evaluate both the OTs needed in Yao's protocol and our OEPs, and hence no additional public-key operations are needed.
Comparison to universal circuit constructions.
We analyze the approach of applying Yao's garbled circuits to the universal circuit construction of Valiant [Val76] and [KS08a] . According to [KS08a] , the number of gates for the Valiant's universal circuit that can handle circuits with g gates is, (19g + 9.5n + 9.5v log(g + n) (Circuits from n inputs to v outputs). The number of gates for the universal circuit of [KS08a] is: 1.5g log 2 g + (u + 2g) log n + (g + 3v) log v. It is possible to use free xor technique on 3/4 of the overhead gates [KS08b] . For a more meaningful comparison we use the parameters for benchmark circuits [KSS12] , such as AES, RSA and Edit-Distance to give concrete numbers on the improvement ratio of our scheme (see Table 4 ).
J.2 Proof of Security for the 2-PFE Protocol
Theorem J.1. Given that the OSN and the OEP protocols are secure against semi-honest adversaries, and that the Yao's protocol uses a symmetric-key encryption with related-key security, the 2-PFE protocol is secure against semi-honest adversaries.
Proof Sketch. What follows is a proof sketch. A complete proof will appear in the full version of the paper. Our 2-PFE protocol can be divided into two stages: (i) generating the random wire keys necessary to create a garbled circuit, and (ii) executing the Yao's garbled circuit protocol using those keys, where P 2 is the circuit garbler and P 1 is the circuit evaluator.
In the 2-PFE protocol, the OEP and the OSN are utilized in the first stage, in a black-box manner. The second stage, simply uses Yao's garbled circuit protocol. In [KM11] it is shown that if the symmetric-key encryption scheme used is semantically secure against linear related-key attacks [AHI10] , and the following two conditions are met, the Yao's garbled circuit protocol is secure against semi-honest adversaries:
1. P 2 cannot distinguish the distribution of the 6g k-bit keys used in garbling (4g for input wires, and 2g for output wires) from a uniformly random distribution U 6gk .
2. P 1 only knows a specific set of linear constraints between a subset of the keys but nothings else, where the set of constraints cannot be used to solve for any key values. More formally, there exist a simulator S 1 that takes P 1 's inputs, and generates P 1 's view in the key generation phase (S 1 need not take the keys as input). In our case, the linear constraints are all of the form i∈T k i = c, for values of c known to P 1 , and for specific subsets T of the keys where |T | ≥ 2.
As a result, our proof will only focus on showing that the first stage of the construction guarantees the above two properties for the set of keys generated. The security of the overall protocol then follows based on the existing proof of security for Yao's garbled circuit protocol implemented with a related-key secure encryption, as provided in [KM11] .
Lets consider the steps of the 2-PFE that constitute the first stage, i.e. steps 1 to 7. We assume the security of the OEP protocol and the OSN protocol and hence consider the real 2-PFE protocol executed in a OPE-and OSN-hybrid model:
• OEP Ideal functionality: P 1 and P 2 use the OEP as the ideal functionality. P 1 sends v (his uniformly random blinding vector) and π as his inputs, and P 2 sends v as his input to the OEP ideal functionality. As a result, P 2 will learn v i = v π −1 (i) ⊕ v i for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2g and P 1 learns nothing.
• OSN Ideal functionality: P 1 produces the mapping π by combining π and v i for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2g. P 1 sends π and t i for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2g as his input to OSN ideal functionality. P 2 also sends X 0 (i), X 1 (i) for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2g, to the OSN ideal functionality. OSN ideal functionality returns (X v i (i)⊕t 2i−1 , Xv i (i)⊕t 2i ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2g to P 2 , while P 1 does not learn anything.
• The list of key pairs (X v i (i) ⊕ t 2i−1 , Xv i (i) ⊕ t 2i ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2g returned to P 2 by the OSN ideal functionality and the additional g key pairs for the output wire generated by P 2 at random, constitute the list of keys P 2 needs to use in Yao's garbled circuit. The first property we need to prove is that P 2 can not distinguish the keys retrieved from the OSN protocol from keys sampled uniformly at random. Consider P 2 's view in the above OSN-, OEP-hybrid real execution. In the OEP ideal execution, P 2 gets to see v i = v π −1 (i) ⊕ v i for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2g, where v is chosen uniformly at random by P 1 , and in the OSN ideal execution he gets to see (
for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2g, where t is chosen uniformly at random by P 1 . Based on the security of one-time pad encryption, his whole view in the above execution can be replace by a uniformly random string. This essentially provides us with our first requirement. Now lets consider P 1 's view in the above execution. P 1 does not receive any outputs from either ideal functionalities (OEP, OSN) and hence his view in the (hybrid) real protocol is simply his inputs, i.e. π, π , v , and t. A simulator S 1 can trivially generate this view since he has the same inputs. This provides us with our second requirement.
According to the above discussion, this completes our proof sketch of security for the 2-PFE protocol against semi-honest adversaries.
Oblivious Switching Network Evaluation (OSN)
Common Inputs: A switching network SN with q switches, and N inputs/outputs. P 1 's Inputs: The selection bit vector s = ((s 0 (0), s 1 (0) ), . . . , (s 0 (q), s 1 (q))) for the switching network SN and a random blinding vector t = (t 1 , . . . , t N ), where t i ∈ {0, 1} . We denote the mapping associated with SN by π. P 2 's Inputs: The vector x = (x 1 , . . . , x N ) , where x i ∈ {0, 1} . Outputs: P 2 learns the output z i = x π −1 (i) ⊕ t i for 1 ≤ i ≤ N . P 1 does not learn anything.
P 1 learns a random encoding of the SN with the selection bit vector s.
1. We denote the 2q + n wires of the SN with w 1 , . . . , w 2q+n . For every 1 ≤ i ≤ 2q + n:
2. P 2 generates a uniformly random bitstring r i ∈ {0, 1} 3. For each switch u with input wires w i and w j , and output wires w k and w l : 4. P 2 computes the following table: Table for each switch 5. P 1 and P 2 engage in a 1-out-of-4 oblivious transfer where P 1 's (the receiver) input is s(u) = 2s 1 (u)+s 0 (u) and P 2 's (the sender) input is (T 0 , T 1 , T 2 , T 3 ). P 1 obtains (T 0 s(u) , T 1 s(u) ), a random encoding of the switch u with selection bits s 0 (u) and s 1 (u). P 2 blinds his inputs.
1. For each input wire w i P 2 sends his blinded input y i = x i ⊕ r i to P 1 . P 1 evaluates the random encoding of SN on P 2 's blinded inputs. 2. P 1 eventually obtains blinded values for all the output wires of SN. He will further blind these values using his random values and send to P 2 . In particular, for each output switch h (1 ≤ h ≤ N/2) with output wires w k , w l , P 2 computes:
z k = y k ⊕ t 2(h−1)+1 , z l = y l ⊕ t 2h P 1 unblinds and retrieves his output.
1. For each output switch with output wires w k , w l , P 1 unblinds its outputs using the random strings for those wires: P 2 generates a key pair Gen(1 k ) → (pk, sk), and sends pk to P 1 (this step is performed once for all gates.
1. P 2 computes the encryptions Enc pk (a 2 ), Enc pk (b 2 ), Enc pk (a 2 b 2 ) and sends them to P 1 .
2. P 1 computes his output share and encrypted output share of P 2 as follows:
• If G(a, b) = a + b: P 1 generates a random value r and locally computes c 1 = a 1 + b 1 − r as his share of output and computes the Enc pk (c 2 ) = Enc pk (a 2 ) + h Enc pk (b 2 ) + h Enc pk (r) as the encrypted output share of P 2 and sends it back to P 2 .
• If G(a, b) = a.b: P 1 randomly generates c 1 as his output share. He then computes Enc pk (c 2 ) = Enc pk (a 1 b 1 − c 1 ) + h Enc pk (a 2 b 2 ) + h (a 1 × h Enc pk (b 2 )) + h (b 1 × h Enc pk (a 2 )), and sends it to P 2 .
3. P 2 decrypts Dec sk (Enc pk (c 2 )) and recovers his share of gate's output c 2 .
Figure 9: 2-Party PGE Protocol for Arithmetic Gate (2-Arith-PGE)
Two-Party Private Function Evaluation (2-PFE(C, x, y)) P 1 's Inputs: x ∈ {0, 1} n , a boolean circuit C with g gates, and o output gates. P 2 's Inputs: y ∈ {0, 1} n . Output: C(x, y).
1. P 1 sorts the gates topologically and computes the extended permutation π C corresponding to circuit C as described in Section 3.
2. P 2 randomly generates a key pair for each of his input bits, and for the output bit of each non-output gate in the circuit. This yields a total of M = n + g − o key pairs. We denote these key pairs by k (a) P 1 and P 2 engage in an OEP protocol where P 1 's input is the extended permutation π C and a random blinding bit-vector v with 2g elements, while P 2 's input is his vector v. As a result, P 2 learns v i = v π −1 (i) ⊕ v i for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2g ( Figure 11 shows the input/output of this OEP protocol).
(b) Consider two switching networks SN 0 and SN 1 where P 1 's selection bits for both are chosen based on π C , and P 2 's input vector to each is X 0 = (X 0 (i)) 1≤i≤M , and X 1 = (X 1 (i)) 1≤i≤M , respectively. The outcome of the EP would be X 0 (π −1 (i)), X 1 (π −1 (i)) for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2g. We attach a third switching network SN 2 to the end of SN 0 , SN 1 . SN 2 contains 2g parallel switches where the ith switch (1 ≤ i ≤ 2g) takes the ith output of SN 0 and SN 1 as its input and takes v i as its selection bit. This extra layer is used to let P 1 swap the final key pairs according to the bit vector v while still enabling P 2 to unblind the results. The collection of these three switching networks form a larger switching network SN with 2M inputs and 4g outputs ( Figure 11 shows the structure of this switching network).
(c) P 1 and P 2 engage in an OSN protocol to evaluate SN , where P 1 's selection bits and P 2 's input vector are already described above. P 1 also uses a fresh blinding vector t with 4g k-bit elements. As a result, P 2 obtains 2g key pairs (X v i (i) ⊕ t 2i−1 , Xv i (i) ⊕ t 2i ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2g.
(d) P 2 swaps each blinded key pair one more time according to the bit v i for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2g. Note that this essentially cancels out the previous two swappings (one by P 1 using v and the other by P 2 using v ), and returns each key to its original location (but blinded). We denote these 2g key pairs with (k 0 i , k 1 i ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2g. 5. P 1 and P 2 are now ready to engage in a Yao's garbled circuit protocol. We do not go into all the details of the protocol and refer the reader to [LP09], for a complete description. However, we point out a few point regarding the garbling and the evaluation process.
• Garbling. For the ith gate in the circuit, P 2 creates the garbled truth table following Yao's garbled circuit protocol, where the key pairs used for the two input wires are (k ) and the key pair used for the output wire is (k 0 i , k 1 i ). P 2 also generates o additional key pairs for the output wire of the output-gates, and uses them in the garbling process.
• Evaluation. P 1 evaluates the gates in the topological order he sorted them, using the Yao's garbled circuit protocol with a minor modification: Suppose P 1 is evaluating the ith gate, and he has already recovered the output keys for the two gates that feed the two inputs. P 1 first blinds these keys using appropriate components of the blinding vector t and uses these blinded values to decrypt one of the four ciphertexts in the garbled truth table. 
